The discussion of the phenomenon of akrasia carried on by Aristotle displays, as one knows, several diffi culties, which have caused reiterated debates amongst contemporary interpreters. These controversies are not just concerned to side issues, but they touch, as it turns out, central issues. In this essay I shall focus my attention on an issue that is mainly a methodological one. My main interest is to understand the role that the Socratic thesis plays in Aristotle's discussion of the topic. It still is an issue of debate what Aristotle's position regarding the Socratic doctrine exactly is: does he simply expose it, or does he adopt it-and, in the latter case, up to what extent? There is place, however, for a more initial, and stronger, astonishment: why does Aristotle busy himself with it at all? After all, Socrates denied altogether the possibility of the weakness of will, and Aristotle not only wants to tackle this problem in a dialectical context in which akrasia is, on the contrary, taken as existent (so that the Socratic thesis is seen as something clearly opposed to the accepted opinions), but he has also a much more natural explanation of it, i.e. an explanation in terms of a confl ict between reason and affection ( pathos), which can be expressed regardless of Socrates' thesis and in fact is conceived of as opposed to the Socratic intellectualism. My main point is rather methodological, and a preliminary one, but it seems to me to be crucial in order to decide what is Aristotle's own thesis: what role does Socrates' position play in the Aristotelian investigation on the nature of akrasia?
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Akrasia as a practical confl ict between reason and appetite
To begin with, one should note that the phenomenon of the weakness of will does not offer any great diffi culty to the Aristotelian perspective. As Aristotle conceives the action to be in the intersection of two * I would like to thank Rodrigo Brandão for rendering into English a fi rst version of this paper, and Annamaria Schiaparelli for kindly helping me improve the fi nal English version. distinct faculties, the rational (practical) one and the irrational part of the soul that is able to consider reason, akrasia explains itself naturally as a confl ict between what the agent knows (on a practical standpoint) and what he desires at a certain moment, or, more precisely, what he has an appetite (epithumia) for. I may know that smoking is harmful to health and, nevertheless, I may wish to smoke a cigarette; in this confl ict between practical reason and appetite, now one course of action imposes itself and now another, leading the agent in one or another direction: the agent may smoke, if the appetite prevails, or he can avoid smoking, if he has got the strength of will commanded by the practical reason. Apparently, there is nothing mysterious here. It could be argued that human action ought not to be thought as a confl ict between appetite and practical reason; however, if the action is so considered-and Aristotle seems to have considered it as such-, the phenomenon of akrasia naturally explains itself in the intersection of those two faculties. It is worth noticing that in saying so, one does not claim the necessity or inevitability of the confl ict, but only its possibility; the desire can be in intimate harmony with practical reason, so that the agent acts without any confl ict, but there can also be a disharmony between appetite and practical reason, so that the subject acts under the mark of the confl ict.
According to Socrates, however, the possibility of a confl ict between reason and emotion does not properly describe what happens within human action. In the Socratic perspective, explaining an action requires referring exclusively to the subject's beliefs. Perhaps beliefs are in some way linked (furthered, thwarted etc.) to pleasure and emotions in general; notwithstanding, action is governed by the beliefs the agent has in the moment he acts, so that it can be treated under a mere epistemic perspective. According to this perspective, one who knows acts well: knowledge is a suffi cient condition for the good action. Obviously, the knowledge here referred to is not the theoretical knowledge, but it is the moral knowledge, the knowledge of all good and evil involved in practical matters.
1 This moral knowledge has a privileged role in
